This pap er investigates how the ownership and the pro cedure for the selection of …rm s op erating in the local public transp ort sector a¤ect their pro ductivity. In order to com pare di¤erent institutional regim es, we carry out a com parative analysis of 72 com panies op erating in large Europ ean cities. This allows us to consider …rm s selected either through com p etitive tendering or negotiated pro cedures. The analysis of the data on 77 Europ ean …rm s over the p erio d 1997-2006 indicates that …rm s op erate under constant returns to scale. Retrieving the residuals we obtain a m easure of total factor productivity, which we regress on …rm and city characteristics. We …nd that when …rm s are totally or partially in public hands their pro ductivity is lower.
Introduction
This paper focuses on local public transport in Europe in order to address three main research questions: 1) is competitive tendering able to select more productive companies?; 2) does public ownership a¤ect productivity? and 3) do mixed public-private …rms in any way di¤er from private and public …rms as for productivity ? We claim that the selection mechanism through which di¤erent cities award the service is a key aspect that in ‡uences …rms' productivity. Although the debate on the impact of contractual schemes on productivity is broad, the empirical evidence on the e¤ects of selection mechanisms on productivity is lagging behind. Nonetheless, this issue has relevant policy implications: in recent years the European Commission has promoted a number of reforms in this …eld, favouring competitive procedures over direct negotiation between the city and the service provider. For example, the implementation of European Directive 1191/69/EU (modi…ed by 1893/91/EU) has led some member states (France, Sweden, The Netherlands) to introduce competitive tendering procedures in the assignment of franchised monopolies in local public transport, thus introducing some competition "for the market" 1 . Thus, the local public transport (LPT henceforth) industry is an interesting case to assess the ability of awarding mechanisms to select the best …rms.
In line with a large body of literature, we also aim at investigating the relationship between ownership and productivity of …rms. Indeed, theoretical predictions on the role of public versus private ownership are not clear-cut, and the empirical evidence is mixed. We contribute to the literature by examining …rms that operate in nine di¤erent European countries, thus adding a comparative perspective which is lacking in most studies on this industry.
Additionally, we extend our analysis to the study of mixed public-private …rms. Although these …rms are a common and relevant phenomenon, they have often been neglected in econometric studies on the LPT industry.
Our data provide answers to our three questions: we observe that …rms which have been awarded the service through a competitive procedure display higher total factor productivity (TFP). Additionally, we observe that public ownership has a signi…cant and negative impact on …rms'TFP. Finally, we …nd that mixed …rms are di¤erent from entirely private ones, being less productive. Nonetheless, the di¤erence between mixed …rms and totally public ones is not always signi…cant, which suggests that the di¤erences between these two types of …rms are less clear-cut.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature and some research hypotheses; section 3 describes the database; section 4 sketches the empirical model to be tested; section 5 presents the results of our empirical analysis and, …nally, section 6 draws some conclusions.
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
Previous analyses of the LPT industry have focused on the impact of alternative contract schemes within one country, observing a choice between …xed-price contracts and cost-plus ones and relating it to e¢ ciency. Empirical evidence con…rms the theoretical prediction that …rms operating under a high-powered incentive scheme, such as a …xed-price contract, are more e¢ cient than …rms operating under a low-powered incentive scheme, such as a cost-plus contract. Research on this topic relies on information on the type of contract implemented, which is available only in ad hoc constructed databases. Thus, previous evidence is country speci…c: Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1996, 2003 ) study the Norwegian bus industry; Kerstens (1996) , Gagnepain Our cross-country data set does not allow us to retrieve …rm-speci…c information on the type of contract implemented. This prevents us from replicating the same empirical exercises as those mentioned above. In any case, notice that a cross-country comparison does not easily lend itself to such a …ne analysis. Comparing di¤erent contracts, possibly constructing some synthetic indicator to classify di¤erent contractual clauses, seems sensible only within a su¢ ciently uniform institutional setting. Where contracts are su¢ ciently similar, as they take place within a given legal framework, one can legitimately focus one's attention on speci…c features. However, contractual arrangements in di¤erent countries can be so di¤erent, to make a quantitative analysis extremely di¢ cult to design.
Henceforth, even if such detailed information were available, the possibility of conducting an appropriate econometric analysis of contracts in a cross-country perspective would be somehow limited 2 . On the other hand, our database allows us to investigate the productivity e¤ects of two broadly alternative institutional arrangements in place in di¤erent European countries. More precisely, we are able to compare total factor productivity of …rms operating under competition "for the market" and …rms operating under negotiated procedures. The label "negotiated procedure" actually denotes the decision of a local public administration to directly identify the supplier of the service, possibly imposing or negotiating some conditions of the service contract. On the other hand, when there is competition for the market, the service provider is chosen through public tendering, whereby the …rm making the "best" bid is selected. Which procedure is able to select the most e¢ cient supplier is a widely debated question, at least since Williamson (1976) . Recent analyses add further substance to the debate. In particular, Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2009) challenge the common wisdom that competition is preferable, showing that negotiations can indeed perform better than auctions when the object of the contract is complex. Hensher and Stanley (2008) push forward a similar argument with respect to bus route contracts. Moreover, they complain that the empirical evidence on the e¤ects of competitive tendering versus negotiation is lacking in the local public transport industry. We aim at contributing to …ll this gap in the literature.
The features of the winning bidder will depend on how the tender is organized, but in some sense the identity of the winner will depend on its e¢ ciency. If the competitive procedure is properly designed, this will certainly be the case (Riordan and Sappington, 1987) . Analogously, if the local authority were able to choose by hart the best possible candidate …rm and to force the service supplier to be extremely e¢ cient, accepting low prices for …nal consumers and/or low subsidies, the …rms selected under negotiated procedures should not be less e¢ cient than …rms selected through competitive tendering.
On the contrary, many observations suggest that local authorities' direct choices operate a substantially worse selection of the service provider than competitive procedures do. While we label direct choices of the supplier as "nego-tiations", several doubts arise on the ability (and e¤ort) of the public administrations we consider, to e¤ectively bargain in order to obtain the best possible result and to force the supplier to provide the service at the least cost. A reason for less than e¤ective bargaining can be that the …rm selected under a "negotiated" procedure is normally the long-time incumbent in a city market and is often owned by the same local authority awarding the licence. In such cases the "selected" …rm operates under a permanent soft budget constraint. However, in many European countries negotiated procedures apply also to a number of private or mixed …rms. Hence there is room for competition having a separate and non-negligible in ‡uence on productivity. On the basis of these arguments, we aim at testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis1: Firms selected by means of competition "for the market" display higher total factor productivity than …rms operating under negotiated procedures.
Let us turn to the in ‡uence of ownership on performance. A large body of literature has focussed on the implications of public versus private ownership, in LPT as well as in other industries. The theoretical ground for this research question was laid by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , who show that the choice the public authority has to face between in-house provision and contracting out is nontrivial. Indeed, contract incompleteness implies that the private company has a stronger incentive to engage in cost reduction and a lower incentive in quality improvement. A state-owned company has stunted incentives both in cost reduction and in quality improvement. However, as cost reduction may also reduce quality, private ownership may result in quality (as well as cost) lower than under public ownership. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) argue that publicly-owned …rms may be forced by politicians to hire an ine¢ ciently high number of workers, while Krueger (1990) suggests that political connections would lead to hiring workers with better acquaintances than better skills. On the other hand, Vickers and Yarrow (1991) argue that agency problems may arise also in large private corporations, where managers own little of the stock and are costly to monitor: in this case there is room for diverging objectives between managers and shareholders.
When moving to the empirical analyses of this issue, the evidence is not conclusive (See Megginson and Netter, 2001) . Notice that authors comparing the relative ability of competitive mechanisms and privatisation to enhance a …rm's productivity also show mixed results. For instance, considering some local public services, Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) indicate that competition is what really matters, while Szymanski (1996) suggests that public ownership is associated to lower productivity.
Quite naturally, the focus of these empirical analyses has been on those industries where the share of publicly owned …rms is large. Local public transport is one such industry. Caves and Christensen (1980) provide an early empirical investigations in this …eld. They study Canadian railroads, …nding no evidence of inferior performance by companies owned by the public sector. More recently, Kerstens (1996) …nds that private bus operators outperform public ones in France. Cowie and Asenova (1999) obtain the same result for Great Britain. Ottoz, Fornengo and Di Giacomo (2008) use a database on Italian …rms in the LPT industry and estimate a translog cost frontier function model attaining the result that public enterprises are slightly more ine¢ cient that private companies. Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) estimate a translog production frontier model on a database of French …rms operating in LPT observing similar results. On the other side, Viton (1997) and Odeck and Sunde (2002) …nd no signi…cant di¤erence between public and private bus companies in the USA and Norway, respectively. Filippini and Prioni (2003) estimate a translog cost model for a sample of private, public and mixed Swiss bus companies and …nd ambiguous results as regards the in ‡uence of ownership on cost-e¢ ciency. Overall, previous empirical evidence on countries which are included in our sample suggests that companies owned by the public sector are less productive than private ones. Therefore, we state our second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Public ownership negatively a¤ ects …rms' total factor productivity.
As for the issue of mixed public-private …rms, the literature is scant. Authors such as Boardman, Eckel and Vining pioneered the research in this area. They suggest that mixed ownership …rms can accomplish pro…tability and social goals at a lower cost, thanks to the internal monitoring by private shareholders (Eckel and Vining, 1985) . They state that mixed enterprises perform better that public ones, but not as well as private ones (Boardman and Vining, 1989) . Nonetheless, the topic has not been further developed since very recently. Marra (2006) provides an explanation for the existence of mixed ownership …rms. Within a property rights framework, he argues that mixed ownership allows for a more e¤ective public control that in the case of concessions to private …rms, and could thus be a solution of the opportunistic behaviour entailed by contract incompleteness. Moreover, as the public intervenes as a regulator, mixed ownership may be a solution to the informational gap between regulator and regulated enterprises. Although scarce, the theoretical literature suggests a third testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Mixed ownership …rms di¤ er from entirely public and entirely private enterprises, showing intermediate levels of total factor productivity.
The Data
We test these hypotheses on a database of LPT …rms operating across nine European countries. Data on local public transport seem to be very hard to …nd. Empirical studies on LPT generally focus on a single country, or even a single region at a time. To the best of our knowledge, the sole paper that investigates the productivity of local public transport companies across di¤erent countries in Europe is Wunsch (1996) , where labour productivity and average cost for a cross-section of …rms is examined. This calls for some new evidence across countries. Indeed, in order to inspect whether alternative institutional regimes have a di¤erential impact on …rm's production choices, we have to extend our analysis across di¤erent countries. In order to select the companies to be included in the analysis, we have followed three criteria.
First, the inclusion in the Amadeus database, maintained by Bureau van Dijk, which provides balance sheet data over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . This database imposes some constraints on the dimension of …rms. More precisely, for Germany, France, Italy and Spain, …rms have to satisfy at least one of the following criteria: a) operating revenue equal to at least e1.5 million; b) total assets equal to at least e3 million; c) number of employees equal to at least 20. For the remaining countries these criteria are relaxed as follows: a) operating revenue equal to at least e1 million; b) total assets equal to at least e2 million; c) number of employees equal to at least 15.
Second, we choose to focus on European Countries. Given the time period considered, we concentrate our analysis on EU 15 countries only. The enlargement process was undergoing at that time, and large institutional changes where taking place in transition countries. Thus, for the sake of comparability, we choose to exclude these countries from our sample. Unfortunately, the Amadeus database does not provide information on sales for …rms located in the United Kingdom. This forces us to exclude this country's …rms as sales are a necessary ingredient of our analysis (as will be explained below). However, the prevalence of competition "in the market" in UK cities (except London) may well have introduced a strong country bias in the empirical analysis.
Finally, in order to avoid pooling together widely di¤erent …rms, we choose to restrict our analysis to …rms operating in "large" cities, therefore excluding from the analysis those …rms that operate in small cities, and are consequently more oriented to extra-urban type of services 3 . The cities included in our sample belong to either of the following two sets:
1. cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants;
2. cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants, but with a metropolitan area with more than 1 million inhabitants.
O¢ cial data on population are sourced from Eurostat. We decide to broaden the …rst criterion by means of the second one in order to include in the analysis those cities which have relatively "small" administrative borders, but whose population is still relevant in size. For example, Brussels would be excluded if considering only the resident population within administrative borders.
Our …nal database has information on 77 …rms distributed across 9 countries, as shown in Table 1 : our sample includes …rms operating in all large EU15 cities, with the notable exception of Paris. Table 14 in the Appendix reports the list of cities included in the analysis.
The data we have are budget data for all these companies. Moreover, on the basis of various sources (web-sites; investigation of national and regional laws; etc.) we have information on how each service provider was selected (whether or not on the basis of an explicit competitive procedure). As already mentioned, we do not have any information on the type on contract each …rm has, nor do we have information on whether (and if yes how) adjustments of the initial contracts are actually carried out. The absence of this information, however, does not impair the kind of cross-country analysis we are pursuing. 
Description of the Database
In order to estimate a production function, we need a measure of output. As our …rm level data are sourced from balance sheet data, this information is not directly available. 4 However, balance sheet data provide information about "sales". This variable includes only the revenue from sales of services, net of public transfers. As a proxy for price, we retrieve the information on monthly ticket price for local public transport from the Urban Audit database developed by Eurostat, and we integrate missing observations by directly looking at companies' web-sites. Thus, combining the information on sales and an average price for the transport service, we are able to build a proxy for output. We are aware that this is a proxy and not a precise measure of output, as it may include revenues from other activities such as, for instance, the management of public parkings. Nonetheless, the use of de ‡ated sales as a proxy for output is widely adopted in the empirical literature. 5 A supply-related measure of output, such as vehicle-kilometers or yearly seat-kilometers would be preferable but, unfortunately, it has not been possible to retrieve this information for a su¢ cient number of companies across countries. As input variables in our production function we have capital (de…ned as tangible …xed assets); labour, expressed as the number of employees; and the cost of material inputs. Nominal variables are all de ‡ated by the country-speci…c consumer price index for transport services, which is sourced from Eurostat. Table 2 reports some summary statistics about the …rms included in the analysis. are expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of employess. VA/L is the ratio of value added over total number of employees. REVENUE/L is operating revenues over total number of employees. Unit labour cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over total number of employees. Mean values over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] Local public transport companies o¤er various types of services, which are produced using di¤erent technologies. The main di¤erence lies in the provision of metro services versus ground transportation services (tram, bus and light rail), since infrastructure costs and technologies are widely di¤erent. We have obtained from companies'web-sites the information on the type of service provided, and whether the …rms operated also extra-urban transportation services. Table 3 shows that …rms operating underground transportation services are signi…cantly di¤erent from …rms operating other types of ground transportation: they are larger, both in terms of capital and number of employees. Moreover, they have larger revenues, value added and sales. The test on the Notice however that the issue of quality measurement is problematic also when direct measures of output are available. equality of means strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the two types of …rms present the same mean values for most of these variables. This suggests to distinguish these …rms from the whole sample in the subsequent analysis. Table 16 in the Appendix reports the full set of descriptive statistics for the two subsamples. ( 0.018)** Capital, total cost of employees, operating revenues, value added and sales are expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of employess. VA/L is the ratio of value added over total number of employees. REVENUE/L is operating revenues over total number of employees. Unit labour cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over total number of employees.
One of the aims of this paper is to shed light on the impact of competition for the market on …rm's performance. In this perspective, countries can be divided into two groups: countries where LPT services are tendered out (France, Netherlands and Sweden) and countries where LPT companies are selected through negotiated procedures (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain). 6 In the period considered, no change from negotiated procedures to competition for the market or vice-versa was detected for the …rms in the sample. We are clearly aware that some aspects of the tendering procedures may differ widely from case to case, and that competitive or collusive outcomes may depend on crucial details of the procedures. The French Competition Commission, for instance, denounced in 2005 the existence of a cartel between three leading operators, who were alleged of coordinating their bidding strategies, leading "the companies to impose their prices to local authorities who consequently have had to bear higher charges than those which would have resulted from a competitive functioning of the market" (Yvrande-Billon, 2006, p. 470). It is precisely because of the potential di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of competition for the market in di¤erent countries that our cross-country analysis may have some value added. Analogously, "negotiated" procedures may di¤er widely in their incentive power. In some cases the local administration may engage in tough negotiations with the …rm in order to extract the highest possible rent, may credibly state its unwilligness to enter re-contracting and/or may set clear-cut bail-out clauses. In some other cases re-contracting and bail-out are perceived by the …rm as without limits. Again, a cross country perspective is useful to average out possible country-speci…c biases.
A simple analysis on the equality of means shows that …rms operating under the two alternative institutional regimes are indeed di¤erent. Table 4 shows the results. When testing the equality of means on the overall sample, di¤erences are limited. Nonetheless, when we concentrate on the sample of …rms operating ground transportation services only, we …nd that institutional settings make a di¤erence. Firms operating under negotiated procedure are generally smaller, both in terms of capital and labour, and in terms of revenues, valued added and sales. Table 17 in the Appendix shows some descriptive statistics by country.
As for the type of ownership, information was retrieved from the Amadeus database, with a cross-check on …rms'web sites. Indeed, as stated in Hypothesis 2, we expect that a public owner may be di¤erent from a private one in terms of TFP.
Additionally, we observe that a third type of …rms exists: those whose ownership is partly public, and partly private. Such mixed …rms represent a relevant share of the sample, as shown in Table 5 . In our sample, about 20% of the total number of …rms have a mixed ownership, totally private ones are around 17%, while totally public …rms are predominant, and represent 63% of our observations. In mixed …rms, the public shareholder is typically in control, as its share never falls below 33.3 %. In many cases (about one half of the …rms), private ownership remains below 15%, so that the di¤erence between these …rms and totally public ones may be considered dubious.
Disentangling the data by the type of transport service provided, we observe that mixed and private ownership types are equally represented in ground transportation services, while totally private …rms are almost absent in the sample of companies providing metro services, which is the stronghold of publicly owned (0.265) Capital, total cost of employees, operating revenues, value added and sales are expressed in thousand Euros. K/L is the ratio of capital over total number of employess. VA/L is the ratio of value added over total number of employees. REVENUE/L is operating revenues over total number of employees. Unit labour cost is the ratio of total cost of employees over total number of employees.
…rms. Two thirds of mixed ownership …rms in the database operate under negotiated procedure. Table 15 shows the share of …rms according to ownership type by country.
Analogously to what we observed about the diversity of arrangements for awarding the service, even the actual content of public shareholding may vary substantially from country to country. In some countries, political interference is heavy and di¤used, while elsewhere managers'autonomy may be deeply rooted. In the same way, elements such as di¤erent legal traditions, di¤erent budget constraints of local authorities and the governance structure of local public …rms are probably relevant elements, which may di¤er substantially across countries. As argued above, it is exactly because of these institutional and political di¤erences that our cross-country analysis may have a particular value added. 
The Empirical Model
In order to estimate …rms' productivities, several modeling alternatives have been used in the literature. Some authors follow a one-step procedure, and estimate either a translog production function or a cost function including into the estimating equation some controls for ownership or contractual agreements (see, among others, Filippini and Prioni, 2003) . Although widely adopted, this methodology seems to rely too much on the inevitably arbitrary choice of the additional variables to be included in the econometric speci…cation. Moreover, in this case estimates would be a¤ected by availability of data on the control variables.
Another widely adopted approach is the estimation of a stochastic production frontier model (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977) . In the standard pooled speci…cation, the mean of the ine¢ ciency term is assumed to be a¤ected by a number of characteristics of interest (see, among others, Roy and YvrandeBillon, 2007). Again, a pooled speci…cation would imply loosing the additional information that can be extracted from the panel structure of our data. Alternatively, one could parameterize the ine¢ ciency term either with a time-invariant model or with the Battese-Coelli (1992) parametrization of time e¤ects. The shortcoming of these two speci…cations is that they do not allow one to model the mean of the ine¢ ciency term as a function of a set of covariates, such as ownership and institutional framework. This would hamper us from testing our research hypotheses.
To avoid these problems, we prefer to estimate the translog production function with …rm …xed e¤ects 7 . Since our controls in the second step are essentially time invariant …rm characteristics, the two-stages option is preferable. Indeed, in this way the production function estimation takes into account all timeinvariant …rm characteristics, without incurring problems of data availability. Additionally, a …xed e¤ect estimator has the advantage of providing an answer to the problem of endogeneity of inputs choices. Notice that the error term in the production function can be decomposed into two terms: " it = ! it + it , where ! it represents unobservables that are unknown to the econometrician, but are observed (or predictable) by …rms when choosing inputs, and it represents unobservables that are not observed by the …rm before input decision. For example, ! it could represent managerial ability, or expected down-time due to vehicles breakdowns, while it could represent deviations from expected breakdowns. Since a …rm has knowledge of its ! it when making input choices, these choices will be correlated with ! it , thus incurring endogeneity. A possible answer to this problem is the estimation by …xed e¤ects. Although this estimator assumes that unobserved productivity ! it is constant over time, it allows one to consistently estimate the production function. Given the short time period we consider, we believe that constancy of ! it is not a strong assumption.
Thus, we choose the following research strategy. As a …rst step, we estimate a production function. We will then retrieve the residuals of this estimation and regress them on ownership and competition variables as well as …rm speci…c variables. This two-step procedure is widely used and acknowledged in the literature (see e.g. Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004).
For the production function, we adopt a ‡exible functional form, which allows us to take into account second-order e¤ects. More precisely, we adopt a translog model (Berndt and Christensen, 1973) , which can be interpreted as a second-order approximation to an unknown functional form, and therefore allows for a large degree of ‡exibility. We estimate a translog production function with three inputs: capital (K it ), labour (L it ) and materials (M it ).
This speci…cation allows us to estimate input elasticities and returns to scale. Moreover, i is a set of dummy variables aimed at capturing the unobservable …rm …xed e¤ects, while " it represents the Hicksian neutral productivity level of …rm i.
As for the second step, we retrieve …rms'total factor productivity, which is the di¤erence between the actual and predicted output, as the residual of the estimated production function. Once obtained an index of TFP from the residual of equation (1), we are able to investigate which factors a¤ect it. Therefore, as a second step of our empirical analysis, we regress this index of TFP on a set of …rm, city and country characteristics. We estimate the following equation:
where f irm_characteristics is a vector of …rm speci…c characteristics such as being part of a group and type of transport service provided. The dummy variable procedure de…nes the type of awarding procedure under which …rms operate, whether competitive tendering or negotiated procedure. The ownership dummy variables de…ne the type of owners, either totally public, totally private or mixed ownership. Finally, city_characteristics is a vector including some features of the cities in which …rms operate, such as population density and GDP per capita. These city characteristics may indeed a¤ect performance: for instance, higher density may imply higher tra¢ c congestion resulting in lower speed of buses and trams, whilst higher GDP per capita may imply higher real wages and di¤erent attitudes towards the choice on public or private means of transport. Finally, notice that the interpretation of coe¢ cients is substantially di¤erent in a one-step procedure or in a two-step. Indeed, in the …rst case the estimated coe¢ cients state how a variable a¤ects the quantity of output produced, for a given level of inputs. In the second, the estimated coe¢ cients directly suggest how speci…c factors a¤ect …rms' productivity. Given the aim of our analysis, namely to investigate how selection mechanisms and ownership a¤ect the productivity of …rms, the two-step procedure yields a set of coe¢ cients which can be directly interpreted.
Take for example the role of selection mechanisms: no economic a priori suggests that the amount of output should be statistically di¤erent between …rms selected by means of a public tendering or negotiated procedures. Indeed, the correlation between the output variable and the procedure variable is 0.06 and not statistically signi…cant. However, economic theory suggests that …rms selected through a competitive tendering should be more productive, and this is con…rmed by a correlation of 0.11, signi…cant at 5% level, between the output variable and the dummy for competitive tendering.
Although the two speci…cations yield the same information, we choose the two-step procedure as it is preferable in terms of readability of the results.
Results

Production Function and Returns to Scale Estimation
The …rst step of our empirical analysis consists in the estimation of the translog production function (1) where, as said, Y it is the index of output, L it is employment, K it are tangible …xed assets and M it are costs for material inputs. All monetary variables have been de ‡ated by a country-speci…c industry de ‡ator. All variables are expressed in logarithms. As speci…ed above, although we will later show that our results do not change drastically under di¤erent assumptions, total factor productivity is de…ned as the error term of this regression. Table 6 presents the results, obtained through di¤erent methods.
We …rst estimate equation (1) by pooling our observations together, using ordinary least squares (see column (1) in Table 6 ). We test the null hypothesis that all interaction terms are equal to zero, which is strongly rejected: this suggests that indeed a translog production function is to be preferred to a Cobb- Hausman test X 2 (9) =71.35*** (0.000) Dependent variable: lnY it is the log of index of output. lnL it is the log of number of employees, lnK it is the log of deflated capital, lnM it is the log of deflated material costs. Column (1) reports pooled estimation (OLS); column (2) a model with firm-specific fixed effects and column (3) a model with firm-specific random effects. Test on interaction terms tests the null hypothesis that all interaction terms are statistically equal to zero. Test on effects provides an F test that all fixed effects are equal to zero in column (2) , and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects in column (3). Standard error in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Douglas one.
Nonetheless, as we use panel data, it is well known that pooling observations together could distort the results, as observations of the same …rm at di¤erent times are counted as totally independent. This is clearly a strong assumption, since we are neglecting that some …rm-speci…c characteristics may in ‡uence a …rm's production function. In order to include them into the analysis, we estimate a model with …rm …xed e¤ects (see column (2)). Again, the test on interaction terms suggests that the translog speci…cation is appropriate. Additionally, a test on the signi…cance of …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ects suggests that these are strongly signi…cant. Therefore, the inclusion of a set of dummies for …rm speci…c …xed e¤ects improves the estimation.
An alternative technique would be to include random e¤ects. This possibility is presented in column (3) in Table 6 . The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random e¤ects suggests that these are again signi…cant. However, a random e¤ects model assumes that the correlation between explanatory variables and …rm e¤ects is 0. This is quite a strong assumption, as we would expect …rm speci…c e¤ects to be correlated with factor endowments. In fact, computing the correlation coe¢ cient between random e¤ects and explanatory variables we …nd that it is equal to 0:208 and is statistically signi…cant at 1%. In order to choose between the two alternative speci…cations, we adopt an Hausman test 8 (see the bottom line in Table 6 ). The test suggests that a …xed e¤ects speci…cation should be adopted. Therefore, we choose this as our preferred speci…cation.
As a robustness check, we repeat our exercise on the subsample that includes …rms operating ground transportation only. 9 We have seen indeed that …rms operating underground transportation services are di¤erent from ground transportation …rms in terms of capital, employees, and sales. Table 7 presents the result for the production function estimations on this subsample, comparing the same methodologies considered in Table 6 . Again, the …xed e¤ects speci…cation (in column (2)) is supported by the data, both against OLS (…xed e¤ects are highly signi…cant) and random e¤ects (as suggested by the Hausman test).
To interpret the estimated …rst-order parameters we calculate the elasticities of output to inputs at di¤erent values of inputs distributions: namely mean, …rst, second and third quartiles. Results are presented in Table 8 . We get signi…cant coe¢ cient estimates for the three inputs included in the production function. Moreover, we obtain constant returns to scale. We test the signi…cance of this result: our null hypothesis is H 0 : " L + " K + " M = 1, which, as shown in the bottom line of Table 8 , is never rejected. Interestingly, we …nd that the estimated returns to scale are decreasing in the size of the …rms. This result is coherent with other …ndings in the literature, see for example Cambini and Hausman test X 2 (9) = 42.15*** (0.000) Dependent variable: lnYit is the log of index of output. lnLit is the log of number of employees, lnKit is the log of deflated capital, lnMit is the log of deflated material costs. Model with firm-specific fixed effects. Test on interaction terms tests the null hypothesis that all interaction terms are statistically equal to zero. Test on effects provides an F test that all fixed effects are equal to zero. Standard error in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Filippini (2003) and Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2007).
It has to be noted that the literature frequently …nds increasing returns to scale: however, these results are generally obtained on samples of small and medium-sized companies (See Cambini, Piacenza, Vannoni, 2007 for a comprehensive review of previous empirical evidence on scale and density economies in LPT). Evidence on large urban companies is scant. Matas and Raymond (1998) study 9 large urban bus companies in Spain, …nding a U-shaped average cost curve. However, in the long run their results do not di¤er appreciably from constant returns to scale, with slight diseconomies for larger companies. Jha and Singh (2001) obtain the same result studying the cost structure of 9 large Indian bus companies. Overall, these articles suggest that scale econom- ies are exhausted for larger companies. More recently, Cambini, Piacenza and Vannoni (2007) obtain the opposite result: using a sample of 31 medium and large-sized Italian companies, they …nd both economies of scale, and economies of density. Our sample includes large companies, and results presented in Table  8 seem to be in line with …ndings by Matas and Raymond (1998) and Jha and Singh (2001) . Testing for the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale, we observe that although estimated returns to scale are decreasing across quartiles, this trend is not signi…cant: at di¤erent values of size for inputs the estimated returns are never signi…cantly di¤erent from one. Table 9 presents the estimated elasticities of output to inputs, computed for di¤erent values of the inputs in the subsample of …rms operating ground transportation only. The …nding of constant returns to scale is con…rmed also in this subsample of …rms which are, on average, smaller than those operating also (or only) underground services. Point estimates of returns to scale are larger in size relative to the estimates obtained in the full sample. 
Determinants of TFP: the Role of Ownership and Competition
We recover our measure of total factor productivity as the di¤erence between actual and predicted output in the estimation of the translog …xed e¤ects production function (equation (1)). This allows us to estimate equation (2): we regress the index of TFP obtained from the estimation of equation (1) on a number of …rm and city characteristics which could in ‡uence …rms'productivity.
In particular, besides our ownership and competition variables, we consider a number of control variables. We control for the …rm's structure, in terms of activities carried out (e.g., underground transportation, extra-urban services) and its management (being part of a larger group or not). Additionally, we include a control for city features (income, size, density and so on). Table 10 presents the results.
Notice that as the coe¢ cients reported are standardized, a comparison between the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is possible. The results in column (1) report a basic regression of our measure of TFP on a set of …rm's characteristics. As expected, the type of transport service provided in ‡uences productivity. The results simply indicate that having …xed structures such as those of companies owning underground (Metro) or surface (Tram) networks, decreases estimated is the log of Total Factor Productivity, obtained as a residual from the production function estimation. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta' coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% productivity. Moreover, tramways may not accommodate the number of passengers that compensates the higher …xed cost entailed by this technology. Instead, …rms which operate underground services, without owning the network, display higher TFP; this is hardly surprising, in that these companies do the same service as those captured by the dummy "Metro", without the …xed input represented by the network. Additionally, we …nd that (arguably more labour intensive) ground transportation services negatively a¤ect …rm's productivity. Moreover, the provision of extra-urban services seems to negatively a¤ect productivity, although this result is not signi…cant. Finally, it turns out that a …rm being part of a large (sometimes multinational) group is likely to be more productive than a stand-alone …rm. This could be due to better managerial practices which are shared among members of the same group.
In column (2) we add a control for the type of institutional (i.e. regulatory) regime. As expected, competitive tendering has a positive e¤ect on total factor productivity: the coe¢ cient attached to the variable is always positive and signi…cant at 1% level. This result provides empirical support to our …rst research hypothesis, namely that a competitive setting may enhance …rms'TFP. Then, we control the e¤ect of the type of ownership in column (3) .
It can be seen that public ownership negatively a¤ects TFP, and the same holds true for mixed ownership. Notice that in this speci…cation we distinguish two types of mixed ownership companies: those in which the public share is predominant (more than 85%), which we label "Mainly public", and those in which the private and public share are more balanced. We suspect that such a relevant public share may imply a management style which is di¤erent from the one in mixed ownership companies, being, if any, closer to the full public ownership type. Thus, we label these companies as "almost" public and in this …rst estimate we consider them as a separate category. 10 These categories of ownership have a negative impact on TFP with comparison to the benchmark, which is the omitted category: privately owned …rms. Thus, we can say that Hypothesis 2 is supported by our data. Our result is in line with Gautier and Yvrande-Billon (2008), who …nd that mixed ownership French LPT …rms have a lower e¢ ciency level than private ones, irrespective of the type of contract under which they operate. As the coe¢ cients are standardized, we are able to compare their magnitudes, and to establish a ranking in terms of productivity. The fully public …rms are the least productive, followed by the mainly public (public share over 85%). The …rms where the public share is below 85% are more productive, and they are not statistically di¤erent from the private ones.
Moreover, the table reports the test on the equality of coe¢ cients between fully public ownership, mostly public ownership, and mixed ownership. The test suggests that the di¤erence in terms of TFP between the three types of …rms is statistically signi…cant, thus supporting the distinction of …rms into these categories. Therefore, we …nd partial evidence in favour of our third hypothesis: mainly public mixed ownership …rms di¤er from private companies, being signi…cantly less productive. Nonetheless, the di¤erence in terms of total factor productivity between "truly" mixed and privately owned companies is not signi…cant. Thus, we may state that mixed ownership companies are not a homogeneous category, and di¤erent groups of mixed …rms are statistically di¤erent in terms of productivity.
Columns (2) to (4) jointly show that regulatory environment and ownership independently a¤ect …rm's total factor productivity: These variables are signi…cant both if considered alone, as in the second and third column, and in combination, as in the fourth column. As seen in Table 5 , many …rms in our sample are in public hands and operating under negotiated procedures. One may wonder whether this "in house" providing is the key factor, rather than ownership and awarding procedures independently. As a robustness check, we include the interaction term between selection mechanism and public ownership in the speci…cation presented in column (4). This term is not signi…cant, while the other variables keep the same signs and signi…cance levels. This clearly indicates that being a totally public …rm, selected through negotiated procedure, does not have any additional e¤ect on …rm's TFP once public ownership and selection mechanism are controlled for 11 .
Finally, thanks to the Urban Audit Database by Eurostat, we are able to include some information on some of the cities where …rms operate, such as city size (both area and population), demographic indicators, income, mobility indicators (Proportion of journeys to work by car, Number of registered cars per 1000 inhabitants, etc.) and indicators of the relevance of touristic activities in the city. Although we cannot report all results, only few of these variables a¤ect our estimates, and they never change the sign and signi…cance of other coe¢ cients. The results in column (5) show that population density does not in ‡uence …rms'productivity in the full sample of the …rms we consider.
12 Table 11 presents the results on the factors a¤ecting total productivity obtained on the subsample of …rms that operate only ground transportation services. Provision of extra urban services is still not signi…cant 13 . Again, being part of a larger group positively a¤ects productivity. This result is more robust in the subsample of ground transportation companies. Firms selected through competition "for the market" display higher levels 1 1 Results are available upon request. 1 2 We also included city area expressed in Km 2 as a control for the network size, generally obtaining a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient. 1 3 Indeed, the evidence on the presence of economies of scope between urban and intercity services is mixed. While Di Giacomo and Ottoz (2007) …nd some evidence of diseconomies of scope, Fraquelli, Piacenza and Abrate (2004) …nd economies of scope. Both papers use a sample of …rms that excludes metro companies. is the log of Total Factor Productivity, obtained as a residual from the production function estimation. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta' coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% of TFP. However, this result is slightly less robust across speci…cations in this subsample. As for the type of ownership, the result that public …rms are less productive is con…rmed. Again, mixed ownership …rms are less productive than private ones, although the ranking in terms of productivity is changed. The di¤erence between fully public …rms, mainly public, and mixed ownership ones is generally statistically signi…cant in the subsample of …rms o¤ering ground transportation services only. Finally, controls for city characteristics suggest that population density now has a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient, thus suggesting the presence of negative congestion externalities that a¤ect ground transports in dense cities and metropolitan areas.
Robustness
The distinction of …rms into four di¤erent categories according to their public ownership share, although supported by the tests that accompany our estimates, may seem somehow ad hoc. Thus, we aim at showing that our preferred speci…cation has been driven by a deep investigation of the relationship between ownership and productivity in our sample. While in the …rst estimate we distinguished four categories of …rms, namely private ones, fully public ones, and two types of mixed …rms, namely the "mainly public" ones (with a share of public ownership abover 85%) and "truly" mixed ones, here we change this speci…cation as follows.
First, instead of using dummy variables, we consider the share of public ownership as a continuous variable, and we include it among our regressors. The results are reported in the …rst three columns of Table 12 . We …nd that the share of public ownership has always a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient, thus suggesting that productivity is inversely related to the weight of public shareholders. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for the selection mechanism (column (2)) and the city features (column (3)).
A second way to analyse the role of ownership is to reduce the number of categories considered, grouping together all …rms where public shareholders have a positive (but less than 100%) stake. The results reported in columns (4) to (6) show that mixed ownership …rms are statistically di¤erent from private ones, being less productive, while the di¤erence with fully public ones does not seem to be signi…cant. The latter result is driven by the heterogeneity within the group of mixed …rms. This is the reason why in the main estimation above we have chosen to distinguish in a speci…c category …rms characterised by a large presence of public ownership. However, the results on the di¤erence between mixed …rms and other types of …rms must be considered with some caution.
A second aspect of our estimate for which we want to test the robustness of the evidence shown in the previous section refers to the relationship between the …xed e¤ect of the …rst stage estimation and the …rms'observable characteristics chosen as explanatory variables in the second stage.
The aim is to provide some additional evidence in favour of the econometric approach adopted: namely a …xed e¤ect estimation in the …rst stage, as in equation (1) plus an OLS estimator on the residuals of the …rst stage, as shown in equation (2) . Here we want to show that the inclusion of …xed e¤ects in the …rst stage is appropriate, as the control variables in the second stage are is the log of Total Factor Productivity, obtained as a residual from the production function estimation. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta' coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% signi…cantly related to the estimated …xed e¤ects. Indeed, as individual …xed e¤ects capture all unobserved …rm characteristics that are constant over time, we expect them to be signi…cantly correlated with the …rms' characteristics considered in the second step.
In order to implement our robustness check, we …rst estimate a translog production function with …xed e¤ects, as in the …rst stage of our preferred methodology. Then, we retrieve estimated …xed e¤ects i and we regress them on the observed …rm characteristics employed in our econometric analysis, in order to see whether such characteristics can really explain unobserved heterogeneity of …rms. Table 13 shows the results. Notice that the dependent variable is no longer TFP but the individual …xed e¤ect. We observe that competition "for the market" is positively correlated with …rm's …xed e¤ects, while ownership variables con…rm the ranking in productivity: public owned …rms are the least productive, followed by mainly public …rms and mixed ownership …rms. 14 Hence, the results obtained in section 5.2 may be regarded as robust. OLS estimates with robust standard errors. Standardized 'beta' coefficients are reported. t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Conclusions
The cross country analysis carried out in the present paper has proved able to shed light on the role that selection mechanisms and ownership have on local public transport …rms in Europe. The main results can be summarized as follows.
First of all, …rms selected through competition "for the market" present higher levels of productivity. Secondly, we …nd that ownership matters: public …rms are generally less productive than private …rms. The same holds true for mixed ownership …rms. However, we …nd that a large heterogeneity characterises mixed ownership …rms, with mainly public …rms (those with a public share over 85%) less productive than other mixed …rms with a lower public share. Our third testable hypothesis refers to the comparison between totally public and partially public …rms. Although our results provide some support to the idea that partial private participation to the shareholding is associated to higher productivity, this …nding depends on the degree of private ownership and therefore on the in ‡uence exerted on managerial choices by private shareholders is not robust across speci…cations. This result calls for further theoretical investigation on the nature and performance of mixed ownership …rms.
Finally, we observe that available indicators of city characteristics rarely a¤ect local public transport …rms'TFP, except for possible negative congestion e¤ects on ground transport services in large cities.
Caution is needed when drawing policy implications from our results. However, there is a mild indication that in the European countries under exam competitive processes have been able to select more e¢ cient …rms than negotiated procedures. This may well depend on the poor quality of the local bodies in charge at negotiating the contracts, or on other causes which are beyond the scope of the present analysis. Whatever the reason, policy proposals advocating a limitation of competitive procedures in this institutional context would need to provide very strong evidence that negotiations yield better results. Any proposal aimed at avoiding competitive pressures in this sector should bear the burden of the proof.
As for ownership, the results above show no ambiguity: …rms in public hands are less productive than private ones. However, the policy implications are less clear cut, as they would depend on what explains our result. The higher productivity of private …rms may have at least two drivers. The …rst is that private shareholders simply have stronger incentives to make sure that the …rm is e¢ cient. The second one is that during the privatisation process of the last few years more productive and pro…table …rms have been sold to private shareholders, so that only less productive …rms have now remained in public hands. Understanding which explanation is preferable, would require further analysis. However it is apparent that privatisation could be a solution only if the power of incentives is the dominant driver of private …rms higher productivity. Otherwise the path to e¢ ciency is far more complex. If one wants to consider the privatisation option, our evidence indicates that mixed …rms are still less e¢ cient than private ones, when the share in private hands is limited. Hence, if privatisation is to be chosen, it seems preferable to go all the way (or most of the way) to private ownership.
However, both competition and privatisation are no panacea: indeed, they may have di¤erent e¤ects in di¤erent set-ups, failing to deliver the expected bene…ts in some circumstances. In particular, although available data do not include the contractual structure, it has to be highlighted that a careful contractual design is crucial in providing the proper incentives to e¢ ciency, with or without competitive tendering, with privately or publicly owned …rms.
Nonetheless, one should be aware that e¢ ciency is not the sole objective of (national or local) policy makers. In particular, we have no data on service quality, which is probably a very relevant and respectable goal of these …rms. Finally, notice that other objectives, such as political patronage (as highlighted by Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) may well prevail. It could be argued that the slow pace of reforms in LPT across Europe is due to an excess of the perceived political costs of privatisation and pro-competitive policies over the expected perceived political gains, accruing from better services and lower costs and subsidies, which might ensue from such reforms. However, this is matter for further research. 
